“We can do this.” In 2015, facing a massive influx of refugees, then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel uttered this phrase, which later became a defining slogan in European refugee policy. A decade later, Chancellor Mertz, also from the CDU, conveyed a截然不同的 message: “The Syrian civil war has ended, and there is no reason for asylum seekers to continue seeking refuge in Germany. This means we can begin repatriation”
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On November 3, 2025, Mertz first articulated this position during a public speech in Husum, Schleswig-Holstein, emphasizing that “those who refuse to return will be deported according to the law”
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. This tough stance marks the decline of the “welcome culture” that emerged after the 2015 refugee crisis and signifies a fundamental shift in the direction of European immigration policy
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01 Policy Reversal: From Open Doors to Initiation of Repatriation
The German government’s shift in policy towards Syrian refugees is both sudden and resolute. Mertz not only announced the start of repatriations but has also invited Syrian Interim President Ahmed Jarba to Germany to jointly explore solutions for the repatriation of Syrian refugees
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Mertz anticipates that “many of the 1.3 million Syrians in Germany will return voluntarily,” while those refusing to return may face repatriation “in the near future”
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To advance this plan, the Mertz government has formulated specific measures. They have invoked Article 72 of the EU treaties, suspended the Dublin Regulation, and strengthened border controls
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. Data shows that in the first three quarters of 2025, Germany had already repatriated over 17,000 immigrants, a year-on-year increase of nearly 20%
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By the end of August 2025, there were over 950,000 Syrian refugees in Germany, 920 of whom had received deportation orders. The daily number of repatriations increased from 120 to 190
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. Contrasting with Mertz’s optimistic predictions, only about 1,000 Syrians chose to return to their home country with German government assistance in the first half of the year
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This policy shift starkly contrasts with Merkel’s “welcome culture” of a decade ago. In 2015, over one million people crossed into Europe, constituting the largest population movement on the continent since World War II
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. Merkel’s decision to open borders was initially welcomed by the German public but quickly became a political burden
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02 Domestic Politics: Far-Right Rise and Governing Pressure
The primary driver for Mertz’s policy shift stems from changes in Germany’s domestic political landscape. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party has risen rapidly, catalyzed by immigration issues, becoming a force that cannot be ignored in German politics
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Latest polls show the AfD leading with 26% support
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Mertz himself has pointed out that Merkel’s open policy contributed to the rise of the far-right AfD. He believes that only by adopting a tougher immigration policy can the further expansion of far-right forces be contained
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Over the past year, Germany has witnessed multiple violent incidents linked to immigrants, such as a Christmas market vehicle ramming attack and a stabbing at a Holocaust memorial. Recently, a 22-year-old Syrian man in Berlin was arrested on suspicion of planning a suicide attack. Such incidents have further heightened public unease about immigration
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AfD leaders have seized the opportunity to criticize the government’s immigration policy, linking the refugee issue closely to public safety and intensifying public sentiment
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Beyond pressure from the far-right, Mertz also faces dissatisfaction within the ruling coalition regarding immigration policy. Many party members demand the government quickly demonstrate decisive action to quell public unrest. In this political reality, Mertz’s tough stance becomes a necessary move to address electoral pressures
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03 Practical Dilemma: Syria’s Actual Conditions and Germany’s Economic Reliance
Mertz’s assertion that “the Syrian civil war has ended” significantly differs from the actual situation in Syria. Although large-scale civil war has ceased and the Assad regime has been overthrown, this does not mean Syria has returned to a “safe and stable” condition
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German Foreign Minister Wadenful, after personally visiting Syria,直言 that the current situation in Syria is worse than Germany in 1945, stating “it is very difficult for people to live with dignity here”
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. He described a scenario where almost the entire population lives below the poverty line, with over seven million internally displaced persons, and basic infrastructure like power and water supply nearly paralyzed
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The challenges in Syria extend beyond reconstruction; sporadic conflicts persist in some areas, and security is difficult to guarantee. The UNHCR has pointed out that Syria’s reconstruction is far from complete, unable to ensure the safe return of refugees, and forced repatriation violates international conventions
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More complex is Syria’s own limited capacity to absorb returnees. In the first half of 2025 alone, over one million Syrians returned from Turkey, Lebanon, and other places, further straining Syria’s already fragile social and economic conditions
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For Germany, large-scale repatriation of Syrian refugees could have severe economic consequences. Germany is experiencing significant population aging, and the labor gap is gradually widening. By 2028, Germany may face a shortage of several hundred thousand workers
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. Syrian refugees have become an important force in filling this gap, particularly in healthcare, transport, and manufacturing
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Approximately 5,000 Syrian doctors play a crucial role in Germany’s healthcare system, especially in resource-scarce rural areas
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. Simultaneously, many Syrians are active in low-wage sectors like manufacturing and catering, where the proportion of immigrant workers is extremely high. Employers state that many locals are unwilling to take these jobs
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04 International Reaction: Legal and Humanitarian Challenges
Mertz’s repatriation plan has sparked controversy at the international level. The UNHCR has clearly expressed opposition, warning that forced repatriation may violate international law and lead to serious humanitarian problems
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According to international law, refugees should not be returned to countries where they may face persecution. Germany’s repatriation policy could face legal challenges
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International organizations like the UN insist that Syria has not yet met the conditions for safe return. Forced repatriation not only violates international conventions but could also plunge more people into humanitarian crisis
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There are also clear differences within the EU on immigration issues. Some countries, like Hungary, have long had stricter immigration policies, while Syria’s neighboring countries hosting refugees have reached their resource and capacity limits. These differences make it difficult for the EU to form a unified policy
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Notably, the Mertz government is attempting to promote some compromise measures, such as engaging with Syrian authorities to pave the way for repatriation. The EU has also suspended some sanctions against Syria and opened market cooperation
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. However, these negotiations are progressing slowly and face a moral dilemma: lacking public support for cooperating with a regime whose “human rights record is concerning”
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05 Political Divisions: Internal Disagreements and Contradictions within the German Government
Mertz’s repatriation plan has caused apparent divisions within the German government. Foreign Minister Wadenful’s position contrasts sharply with Mertz’s. After visiting Syria, Wadenful expressed that the situation there is not stable and secure enough for many to return quickly
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Wadenful was once a firm supporter of Mertz’s anti-immigration policy, but his on-the-ground inspection changed his view. He even stated that Syria’s current state is worse than post-war Germany in 1945, remarks that caused dissatisfaction within Mertz’s camp. Some legislators accused Wadenful of undermining the government’s unified stance
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To ease tensions, Wadenful later stated he would “actively participate in pursuing the government’s common goal of increasing the number of deportations”
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. A German government spokesperson also tried to downplay the disagreement within the coalition, stating that the “Chancellor supports the Foreign Minister”
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The center-left SPD within the ruling coalition emphasizes social justice and advocates for a milder approach towards immigrants, praising Wadenful’s “realism,” which differs from Mertz’s view
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06 European Trend: From “Welcome Culture” to Collective Rightward Shift
The change in Germany’s refugee policy is not an isolated case but a reflection of a shift in the overall political climate across Europe
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. Over the past two election cycles, the number of seats held by anti-immigration far-right parties in European national parliaments has almost doubled, reshaping how Europeans view and discuss immigration
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In the UK, immigration has become the most important issue for voters. The Labour government introduced a series of measures to tighten immigration policies, including raising the residency requirement for permanent settlement and increasing salary thresholds for skilled worker visas. The anti-immigration UK Reform Party is recognized by 38% of respondents in polls, far surpassing Labour and the Conservatives
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The French parliament passed a stringent new immigration law, extending the waiting period for immigrants to access certain benefits and introducing an immigration quota system. More controversially, the law stipulates that dual citizens convicted of serious crimes may be stripped of their French nationality
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In July 2024, immigration ministers from Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, and Poland met in Germany and issued a joint statement emphasizing enhanced cooperation to effectively reduce illegal immigration
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. EU countries have identified five priority areas for cooperation on immigration, including combating transnational human smuggling and enhancing repatriation efficiency
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Behind Europe’s shift in immigration policy lie profound economic and social roots. Economically, European growth remains persistently weak, with the EU’s average growth rate at only 1.2% over the past five years, dropping to 1% in 2024
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. The energy crisis has driven up costs and triggered inflation. Coupled with an aging population and labor outflow, society’s capacity to absorb immigrants has diminished
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The joint statement from the ministers’ meeting on the Zugspitze perhaps indicates the future direction: “The EU must restore public trust in its immigration policies, ensure the rapid repatriation of persons without right of residence, while protecting the rights of refugees genuinely in need of help”
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This policy shift affects not only politics but also the daily lives of Syrians in Germany. Many have lived in Germany for years, with hundreds of thousands of children born and educated there; they have become disconnected from Syrian reality
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. As one Syrian remarked, poignantly highlighting the gap between policy and personal circumstance, “A camel is now only worth one dollar, but I don’t even have that dollar”
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Finding a home for refugees is essentially about finding a future for Europe. And this future requires finding a balance between ideals and reality, humanitarianism and interests
