In the Middle East, a land of intertwined power and conflicting interests, even the closest allies cannot conceal deep-seated structural contradictions. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, the “twin stars” of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), appear to be working hand in hand to confront Iran, jointly attack the Houthi armed forces, and belong to the Sunni camp. However, they have already planted the seeds of differences in the war in Yemen, torn open the cracks in energy policies, and moved towards confrontation in the regional discourse power struggle. The so-called ‘incompatibility’ is not a momentary emotion, but an inevitable collision between the rise of small countries and the hegemony of major powers.
1、 Yemen battlefield: from fighting side by side to fighting behind the scenes
In 2015, Saudi Arabia led the formation of a multinational coalition to intervene in the Yemeni civil war, and the United Arab Emirates actively responded, becoming one of the countries that actually sent the most troops. But as the war progressed, the strategic goals of the two countries quickly diverged:
Saudi Arabia pursues “legitimacy” and regional leadership: supporting the return of the legitimate government of Yemen, aiming to consolidate its position as the leader of the Arab world, especially occupying the moral high ground in the narrative of Sunni resistance against Iranian expansion.
The United Arab Emirates pursues “influence infiltration”: after recapturing Aden and other places, it has turned to supporting the “Southern Transitional Council” to promote separatist forces in southern Yemen, with the intention of creating a pro UAE autonomous regime and achieving a strategic foothold in the southern wing of the Arabian Peninsula.
This move is tantamount to “digging Saudi Arabia’s corner” – if Yemen splits, the Saudi led narrative of a “unified Arab camp” will be weakened, while the United Arab Emirates can enhance its voice as a “regional manipulator”. What is even more dissatisfying to Saudi Arabia is that the UAE has far outperformed the Saudi military on the battlefield, even being referred to by Western media as the “most efficient Gulf force”, which further exacerbates Saudi Arabia’s sense of insecurity.
2、 Political opposition: The Muslim Brotherhood dispute exposes ideological rifts
The differences between the two countries are not limited to geopolitical operations, but also go deeper into ideological levels:
Saudi Arabia has close ties with the Yemen Renewal Party, which has a Muslim Brotherhood background, and is attempting to build an anti Iran alliance through political Islamic forces;
The United Arab Emirates regards the Muslim Brotherhood as a “subversive threat” and has already classified it as a terrorist organization domestically, firmly resisting its political expansion.
This fundamental opposition makes it difficult for the two countries to reconcile their political reconstruction plans in Yemen. The United Arab Emirates regards Saudi Arabia’s allies as “potential enemies” and naturally cannot sincerely cooperate with its led peace process. When the Saudi Defense Minister emphasized “complying with the agreement and promoting a political solution”, Abu Dhabi publicly criticized it in the media, which shows its dissatisfaction with Saudi Arabia’s “weak position”.
3、 Energy Game: Power Challenges within OPEC+
The real push to the table of contradictions was the collapse of the 2021 OPEC+negotiations. The United Arab Emirates has openly obstructed the production increase agreement, demanding an increase in its benchmark production to 3.8 million barrels per day, citing that the existing benchmark (3.168 million barrels per day) is “outdated” and fails to reflect the surge in production capacity brought about by its massive investment.
As the de facto leader of OPEC, Saudi Arabia insists on maintaining the existing system of rules and refuses to reset benchmarks, fearing that setting such a precedent will shake the entire production reduction mechanism;
The United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, takes advantage of the global economic recovery to advocate for the urgent need for increased production in the market, but in reality, it is striving for larger quotas and enhancing its voice in the global energy landscape.
This’ oil diplomacy showdown ‘ultimately ended with a brief concession by the United Arab Emirates, but the signal it sent was extremely strong: the UAE is no longer willing to be a’ compliant little brother ‘. Subsequently, The Wall Street Journal revealed that internal discussions within the United Arab Emirates to withdraw from OPEC, although not taking place, were a blatant challenge to the Saudi led order.
4、 Awakening of Diplomatic Autonomy: Backed by the United States, Challenging the Authority of ‘Big Brother’
The UAE dares to openly challenge, with clear strategic support behind it:
US strategic tilt: The Biden administration has developed resentment towards the Shatin Khashoggi case, production cuts, and other issues, and has instead strengthened security cooperation with the United Arab Emirates. The US military has multiple military bases in the UAE, with deep ties between the two sides in areas such as drones, intelligence, and air defense.
Diversified diplomatic route: The United Arab Emirates actively develops relations with China and Russia, while normalizing relations with Israel (Abraham Accord), and even establishing diplomatic relations before Saudi Arabia recognized Israel, demonstrating stronger diplomatic independence.
Economic model transformation: Dubai and Abu Dhabi achieve economic diversification through non oil industries such as finance, tourism, and technology, reducing dependence on traditional oil power structures and thus having more confidence in challenging the Saudi led “oil political order”.
5、 Deep Logic: Rise of Small States vs. Hegemony of Great Powers
The “incompatibility” between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia is essentially a microcosm of the changing regional power structure:
Saudi Arabia is still attempting to maintain its traditional position as a “co ruler of the Gulf”, relying on religion, history, and oil hegemony;
The United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, seeks to transform from a “follower” to a “co ruler” with a “pragmatic, flexible, and modern” governance model, and even replace it in certain areas.
As the iron law of international relations says, “There are no eternal friends, only eternal interests.” Although both countries belong to the Gulf Cooperation Council, share the same faith in Sunni Islam, and resist Iran, when their core interests collide, the warm veil of the alliance will eventually be torn off.
Conclusion: Cracks are difficult to heal, but war is not easy
Despite the increasingly public nature of the conflict, a comprehensive rupture is still not what both sides wish for. After all, in the face of Iran’s regional expansion, internal stability pressures, and global power struggles, the Shah still needs each other as strategic buffers. However, the old order of “big brother” and “little brother” has been shaken, and the future Gulf may enter a new era of multipolar games and competition.
The United Arab Emirates is no longer willing to be a shadow, and Saudi Arabia can no longer act arbitrarily. This is not only the “incompatibility” between the two countries, but also the beginning of the reconstruction of the power map in the Middle East.
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