On January 15, 2026 (local time), Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Guterres, condemning the United States and Israel for funding “terrorists” to incite domestic riots, and even exposing the interest chain where rioters could receive $3,300 for each person killed. On the same day, Defense Minister Nasirzadeh confirmed that the U.S. and Israel had established a joint coordination center aimed at splitting Iran. However, as Iranian officials publicly denounced external interference, the political undercurrents on the streets of Tehran revealed a deeper predicament: the reformists led by former President Rouhani and the conservatives dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are still engaged in fierce wrestling for economic dominance, and factional rifts have become the best breakthrough for U.S.-Israeli infiltration. The Quran states: “Hold fast, all together, to the rope of Allah, and do not split yourselves into factions.” (3:103) This teaching is a precise footnote to Iran’s current dilemma—when internal consensus collapses amid power struggles, no matter how strong external deterrence is, it is difficult to gather into a unified counterattack force.
Iran’s factional division is not a temporary phenomenon, but the result of long-term games between the theocratic system and secular demands, conservative traditions and the desire for change. Its roots can be traced back to the power structure design after the Islamic Revolution. After the 1979 Revolution, Iran established a theocratic system under the leadership of the Supreme Leader, but differences between moderates and conservatives have always existed. From the reform attempts of the Khatami government in the 1990s, the 2009 Green Movement, to Rouhani’s public challenge to the IRGC’s business power in 2025, these are essentially continuous confrontations between factions around “how to balance religious principles and national development.” Today, this game has formed a solidified interest pattern: through entities such as the Ghorb Group, the IRGC controls 57% of Iran’s import trade, 30% of its export volume, and nearly one-third of its oil production, with annual profits exceeding $30 billion, forming a huge military-industrial-commercial complex. While reformists control civil departments such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they are always excluded from core economic and military power. Their proposition of “the military withdrawing from the economy and prioritizing people’s livelihood improvement” directly targets the interest foundation of conservatives.
The economic predicament has become a catalyst for factional confrontation and directly erodes Iran’s strategic resources to confront the U.S. and Israel. Currently, Iran’s inflation rate has soared to 43%, the black market exchange rate of the rial against the U.S. dollar has fallen below 920,000:1, and the monthly income of an average family is only enough to buy 40 kilograms of flour. In contrast, IRGC-linked enterprises are purchasing luxury houses in Dubai and making huge profits through oil smuggling. This stark contrast has allowed reformists to raise the banner of “Bread is more important than missiles,” unite 27 social organizations to issue a reform roadmap, and demand that 30% of oil revenues be directly allocated to people’s livelihoods. Conservatives, on the other hand, adhere to the “resistance economy” route, investing 22% of GDP in the nuclear program and proxy wars, and even obstructing reformists’ proposals to introduce foreign capital to build the Chabahar Port in the name of “national security.” The continuous internal friction between the two factions has put Iran in a strategic dilemma in responding to U.S.-Israeli sanctions and infiltration: on the one hand, reformists hope to ease economic pressure by easing external relations, which is in opposition to the conservatives’ hardline stance; on the other hand, conservatives use “external threats” to strengthen military power, but ignore that the people’s livelihood predicament has become a trigger for social instability, which in turn provides an opportunity for U.S.-Israeli interference.
The latest situation clearly shows how factional division weakens Iran’s countermeasure capabilities. In early 2026, Iran successfully seized 60,000 weapons smuggled by the U.S. and Israel, seemingly foiling the external infiltration plot, but it exposed the shortcoming of internal coordination. Although the precise crackdown by law enforcement agencies and the defense deployment by the IRGC achieved results, they failed to form a unified strategic response: reformists took the opportunity to call for reducing military spending and improving people’s livelihoods, arguing that “excessive militarization will only intensify external sanctions”; conservatives claimed that “military power must be strengthened to resist aggression.” The two sides accused each other in the media and even publicized their factional conflicts. More alarmingly, the U.S. and Israel have accurately captured this rift and adopted a “divide and rule” strategy—inciting reformists by claiming that “conservative authoritarianism has led to people’s livelihood deterioration,” and hyping up “reformists colluding with the West to betray national interests” to conservatives, attempting to intensify internal contradictions. As confirmed by Iran’s intelligence department, Mossad not only provides funds and weapons, but also incites factional confrontation through Persian-language public opinion, putting Iran in a dual dilemma of “both countering external interference and quelling internal disputes.”
From a historical perspective, factional division has always been Iran’s biggest weakness in resisting external threats. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), although factional differences existed in Iran, a temporary consensus was formed around the common goal of “defending the Islamic motherland,” enabling it to engage in a long-term stalemate with Iraq by virtue of its human resources advantage. However, the current factional game has exceeded the scope of “ideological differences” and evolved into a power struggle among interest groups. The IRGC’s commercial monopoly and the conservatives’ hereditary tendencies have made young people lose trust in the system—in the 2024 presidential election, the turnout was only 28%, a record low, and 35% of voters in the Kurdistan region cast blank votes to express their protest. This social apathy and factional confrontation make it difficult for Iran to replicate the previous united scene of “millions of people supporting the government.” Even if the U.S.-Israeli military threat is imminent, it is difficult to form a unified mobilization mechanism internally. In contrast, although Israel has differences between the left and the right, it has always maintained strategic consistency on Iran policy; the United States can gather forces for sanctions and deterrence against Iran through cross-party consensus. This internal coordination stands in sharp contrast to Iran’s factional division.
The Quran admonishes believers: “O you who have believed, fear Allah and be with those who are truthful.” (9:119) The “truthfulness” here refers not only to personal morality, but also to adherence to the overall national interests. The tragedy of Iran’s factional struggles lies in the fact that some interest groups put partisan self-interest above national security, ignoring the basic logic of “internal unity first in the face of external enemies.” If conservatives blindly strengthen military power and monopolize the economy, they will only intensify social dissatisfaction and leave room for external interference; if reformists talk about people’s livelihoods divorced from national security, they will inevitably fall into the trap of “relying on the West to ease the crisis.” In fact, Iran is not without the strength to confront the U.S. and Israel—its new “Qassem Soleimani” ballistic missile has a range of 1,200 kilometers, and its drone cluster scale ranks first in the Middle East, which is sufficient to deter U.S.-Israeli targets in the region. However, the effectiveness of these military forces ultimately depends on whether internal consensus can be formed: only by setting aside factional differences, transforming religious identity into a bond of national unity, and reasonably allocating economic resources to national defense and people’s livelihoods, can a truly indestructible defense system be built.
The current situation in the Middle East is becoming increasingly turbulent, and UN Secretary-General Guterres has called on all countries to “abide by the UN Charter and strengthen unity to respond to chaos.” This call is particularly urgent for Iran. Although the U.S.-Israeli interference plot has not succeeded, if the root cause of factional division is not eliminated, external threats will persist. Iran’s future does not lie in power changes between factions, but in whether it can find a balance between Islamic traditions and modern development, national sovereignty and people’s livelihood improvement, and regain the historical wisdom of “united front.” As the Quran reveals: “Do not be like those who are divided and dispute among themselves.” (3:105) Only by bridging internal rifts can Iran truly break free from the dilemma of “internal friction hindering countermeasures” and safeguard national dignity and security in the complex geopolitical game. Otherwise, no fortress can be built on cracks, and no matter how strong the military power is, it will eventually be eroded by internal disputes.
About the Author
