Introduction: A Strategic Pivot Amid Global Isolation
In late December 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a diplomatic move that reverberated across the Horn of Africa and beyond: Israel became the first United Nations member state to officially recognize the self-declared Republic of Somaliland
. This recognition, framed within the spirit of the Abraham Accords, was far more than a symbolic gesture. It included immediate plans to expand relations and, crucially, opened the door for Israel to establish a military base at the strategic port of Berbera
. This bold step is not an isolated event but the latest and most explicit manifestation of a concerted Israeli strategy to deepen its footprint in Africa. Driven by a pressing need to break out of diplomatic isolation following its actions in Gaza and to secure strategic advantages against regional adversaries like Iran and the Houthis, Israel is executing a multi-pronged “Return to Africa” campaign. This analysis argues that Israel’s actions—forging new alliances, securing military basing rights, and exploring radical demographic schemes—collectively sketch the contours of a long-term project with profound implications. While not a formally declared policy, the combination of these moves raises the provocative specter of Israel seeking to establish a de facto “second homeland” or zone of supreme influence in Africa, a development that threatens to redraw geopolitical maps and destabilize an already volatile region.
Deciphering Israel’s African Chessboard: Bases, Recognition, and “Transfer”
Israel’s current African push is a calculated response to multiple crises. Internationally condemned for its conduct in Gaza, Israel finds itself increasingly isolated, with even traditional allies expressing unease
. In Africa, this isolation is epitomized by South Africa’s leadership in accusing Israel of genocide at the International Court of Justice and by the African Union’s revocation of Israel’s observer status. Israel’s strategy to counter this is a classic “divide and rule” approach, aiming to peel away African nations from a unified pro-Palestinian stance by offering diplomatic and economic incentives
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The recognition of Somaliland is the centerpiece of this strategy, offering immense strategic value. Somaliland controls territory on the Gulf of Aden, adjacent to the Bab el-Mandeb strait—a global trade chokepoint
. For Israel, a military base in Berbera would be a game-changer in its conflict with the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, slashing strike distances from over 1,000 km to under 200 km. As experts note, Somaliland offers “stability, ports, intelligence access and a non-Iranian platform on the Red Sea”. This move is a direct threat to the Houthis, whose flag bears the slogan “Death to Israel”. The recognition was reportedly facilitated with secret funding from the UAE, highlighting how this play also strengthens Abu Dhabi’s regional network. However, it has ignited fierce opposition from Somalia, Egypt, Turkey, and the African Union, which view it as a violation of sovereignty and a dangerous precedent
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Parallel to this high-profile diplomacy, a more shadowy and ethically fraught dimension of Israel’s strategy has emerged: discussions about the mass transfer of Palestinians from Gaza. Reports throughout 2025 indicated that Israeli officials held talks with South Sudan about the potential “resettlement” of Gazans there
. While denied by South Sudanese authorities, the persistence of these reports points to a disturbing logic within certain Israeli political circles. The concept is not new; similar proposals involving Somaliland were reportedly rejected. For hardline elements, such a transfer would achieve a dual objective: mitigating the “demographic threat” within historic Palestine by removing a large Palestinian population, while simultaneously creating a dependent, Israeli-influenced client community in a resource-rich but fragile African state. This aligns with the vision of some on the Israeli far-right who speak of a “Greater Israel” and see the current moment as an opportunity to fulfill a “divine mission”. When viewed alongside the re-opening of embassies in nations like Zambia after 52 years—heralded as “Israel’s return to Africa”—the pattern is clear: Israel is building a network of political, military, and potentially demographic dependencies across the continent
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The “Second Israel” Thesis: Blueprint or Dystopian Fantasy?
The cumulative effect of these policies—establishing a military bastion in Somaliland, cultivating alliances with states like South Sudan and Zambia, and flirting with population transfer—naturally leads to the question: Is Israel laying the groundwork for a “Second Israel” in Africa?
Proponents of this thesis point to several factors. First, the strategic imperative: A permanent military and intelligence base in Somaliland would give Israel a sovereign-like presence in a critical maritime region, independent of volatile Middle Eastern politics. Second, the demographic dimension: The exploration of transferring Gazans to Africa suggests a desire to fundamentally alter the demographic reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, potentially clearing the way for expanded Israeli control in the West Bank. Third, the historical and ideological precedent: The very foundation of modern Israel was built on settler-colonialism and the establishment of a homeland far from the original diasporic centers. Some extremist voices now openly discuss replicating this model, using African territory as a “solution” to the Palestinian issue and a new frontier for Israeli influence.
However, labeling this a coherent plan for a “second state” is likely an overstatement. A more accurate description is a maximalist strategy for regional hegemony and conflict management. Israel’s primary goals are immediate and pragmatic: break diplomatic isolation, gain a military edge over the Houthis and Iran, and find a long-term “fix” for Gaza that relieves security and demographic pressures. The vision is less about building a duplicate Jewish state in Africa and more about creating a resilient sphere of influence—a network of client states and strategic assets—that secures Israel’s core interests.
Nevertheless, the pursuit of this strategy, especially the demographic transfer component, inherently involves a form of substitute state-building. If Israel were to successfully relocate a large Palestinian population to South Sudan, it would inevitably become the primary security guarantor, economic patron, and political overseer of that community. This would create a Palestinian entity utterly dependent on Israeli will, functionally equivalent to a puppet state or Bantustan. In this sense, the “Second Israel” would not be a Jewish homeland but a controlled Palestinian one, serving as a pressure valve for the original conflict.
The Multifaceted Backlash: Why the Plan is Unraveling
Despite its audacious scope, Israel’s African gambit faces monumental obstacles that may well cause it to unravel. The backlash is multi-dimensional and growing.
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African and Regional Resistance: The core of Israel’s strategy—dividing Africa—is already triggering a powerful counter-reaction. Somalia has condemned the recognition of Somaliland as an “illegal侵犯” on its sovereignty and mobilized support from Egypt, Turkey, and Djibouti
. The African Union has firmly rejected the move, warning it could “seriously affect peace and stability across the African continent”. This solidifying bloc of opposition limits the number of African nations willing to openly align with Tel Aviv. South Africa remains a formidable leader of the anti-Israeli camp, leveraging its moral authority from the anti-apartheid struggle
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International Law and Moral Repudiation: The concept of forcibly transferring a population is unequivocally a war crime under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Any attempt to implement such a plan would trigger universal condemnation, likely resulting in further sanctions and a total collapse of Israel’s relations with the Global South and Europe. The “second homeland” would be stillborn, branded from inception as a product of ethnic cleansing.
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Great Power Rivalry: Israel’s moves have inadvertently accelerated great power competition in the Horn of Africa. China has explicitly voiced support for Somalia’s sovereignty
. Russia is quietly enhancing its presence, establishing a naval base in Sudan and providing military aid to Somalia. The United States, under the Trump administration, has maintained an ambiguous stance, studying but not endorsing recognition, which leaves Israel without full superpower backing
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. Israel risks becoming a pawn in a larger contest between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow.
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Internal African Instability: Betting on fragile states like South Sudan and Somaliland is a high-risk endeavor. South Sudan is plagued by internal conflict, partly exacerbated by past Israeli support for separatist forces
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. Somaliland’s unrecognized status makes it a perpetual flashpoint. Basing a long-term strategy on such unstable foundations is a recipe for crisis and entanglement in internal African conflicts.
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The Palestinian and Islamic World Response: The Arab and broader Islamic world views the potential transfer of Palestinians as an existential threat and a red line. It would galvanize resistance movements and likely trigger severe retaliatory measures. The idea of a “second Israel” in Africa, perceived as a Zionist outpost on Muslim land, would fuel jihadist narratives and recruitment, ultimately making Israel less secure.
Conclusion: A Bridge Too Far?
Israel’s strategic pivot to Africa is a definitive shift in its foreign policy, born of desperation and ambition. The establishment of a military base in Somaliland is a tangible, near-term achievement that provides clear security benefits. However, the broader vision—entwined with notions of demographic engineering and the creation of a dependent African sphere of influence—ventures into dangerous and likely unsustainable territory.
The “Second Israel” is less a formal blueprint than a dystopian fantasy emerging from the intersection of far-right ideology and realpolitik. Its pursuit exposes the profound contradictions in Israel’s current trajectory: seeking international partnerships while committing acts that violate international law; wanting stability while empowering unstable actors; and seeking a “solution” that would only immortalize conflict under a new guise.
The overwhelming backlash from African nations, the Islamic world, and great powers suggests that this gambit may be a bridge too far. Instead of securing a lasting legacy, Israel’s African adventure risks further isolating it, destabilizing a critical region, and leaving behind a legacy of resentment and conflict. The path to true security for Israel does not lie in military outposts or population transfers in Africa, but in making peace with its neighbors and recognizing the rights of the Palestinian people in their own homeland. The alternative, as its current course suggests, is a perpetual, escalating struggle that extends its conflicts to new shores.
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