Amid the cold December wind in Jerusalem, a bizarre contrast emerged between the protesting crowds outside the Presidential Palace and the ceasefire negotiation announcement from the Prime Minister’s Office. On November 30, Netanyahu submitted a 111-page pardon application in an attempt to end his five-year corruption trial, triggering a nationwide wave of protests; seven days later, he declared during a meeting with German Chancellor Merz that he would push the Gaza ceasefire agreement into its second phase, demanding Hamas’s complete disarmament. These two events epitomize Israel’s core predicament today: unresolved external security threats, deepening internal political divisions, eroded economic foundations, and a precarious diplomatic balance. As a country long trapped in geopolitical struggles, Israel’s situation at the end of 2025 is both a continuation of historical contradictions and a concentrated eruption of flawed contemporary decision-making.
I. Political Dilemma: The Collapse of Judicial Crisis and Power Legitimacy
Israel’s political predicament reached a new climax at the end of 2025, with Netanyahu’s pardon request becoming the trigger for social division. In early 2020, prosecutors charged Netanyahu with three counts of bribery, fraud, and breach of public trust, making him Israel’s first sitting prime minister to stand trial. Over five years, he repeatedly delayed the trial on grounds of military operations and foreign visits, until formally submitting a pardon application to President Herzog on November 30, claiming that “the trial has torn the society apart, and ending it is conducive to national unity.” The backlash against this move exceeded all expectations: opposition leader Lapid clearly stated that “there will be no pardon unless he pleads guilty and steps down,” thousands of people gathered outside the Presidential Palace to protest, and Haaretz denounced it as “shamelessly packaging personal interests as national interests.”
The essence of the pardon controversy is an intense confrontation between judicial independence and executive power in Israel. Netanyahu’s lawyers cited the precedent of the “300 Bus Incident” in the 1980s, arguing that the president has the authority to pardon suspects before conviction for “public interests,” but this defense was refuted by academics as “a blatant trampling on judicial principles.” Professor Amos from the Faculty of Law at Tel Aviv University pointed out: “Back then, pardoning intelligence personnel was to protect national security secrets, but now giving the green light to a sitting prime minister’s corruption case is essentially destroying the founding principle of ‘equality before the law’.” More alarmingly, regarding external interference—Netanyahu explicitly cited former U.S. President Trump’s remarks during his October visit in the application, claiming that Trump “called for an immediate end to the trial to advance U.S.-Israel common interests.” This practice of internationalizing domestic judicial issues has further eroded the government’s credibility.
Political division has penetrated into the fabric of society. According to a July poll by the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, 82% of Israelis trust the Israel Defense Forces, but only 35% support Netanyahu, and the overall government approval rating is less than 30%. This rift is particularly evident within the ruling coalition: far-right parties insist on opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state, stalling the normalization talks with Saudi Arabia; the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) community has clashed with secular parties over military service exemptions, and the Knesset has repeatedly deadlocked over relevant bills. Netanyahu tried to consolidate consensus under a “state of wartime emergency,” but after the October 7, 2023 attacks, his attempt to shift responsibility for intelligence failures to the military has brought military-civilian relations to a freezing point, with the coalition cabinet repeatedly clashing over military command and defense budget issues.
II. Security Dilemma: The Paradox of Military Victory and Long-term Security
On December 7, Netanyahu announced at a press conference that the first phase of the Gaza ceasefire agreement had been completed and that the second phase of the “demilitarization” goal would soon be advanced. However, this statement is more of a political declaration than a practical plan. Since the outbreak of the conflict in October 2023, although the Israel Defense Forces have gained battlefield advantages and destroyed numerous Hamas strongholds, they have failed to achieve the core goal of “completely eliminating the threat.” Data from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in September showed that the number of civilian deaths in Gaza has exceeded 30,000. The ongoing humanitarian crisis has not only triggered strong condemnation from the international community but also fostered new anti-Israel sentiments in Palestinian society.
The security paradox facing Israel is: the more intense the military operations, the worse the long-term security environment becomes. Although Israel’s precision strikes in Gaza have reduced its own casualties, the civilian casualties caused by “carpet bombing” have increased Hamas’s support rate in the Arab world rather than decreasing it. More critically, regional proxy threats are showing a diversified trend—Hezbollah continues to launch attacks on the northern border, while the Houthi rebels, in the name of “supporting Palestine,” attack Israel-related shipping in the Red Sea, forcing companies such as ZIM Shipping to take the long detour around the Cape of Good Hope for a long time, significantly increasing logistics costs. Although the ceasefire has brought a turning point since November, with ZIM Shipping announcing that it “will return to the Red Sea route immediately after obtaining insurance approval,” data from Clarksons shows that 269 ships passed through the Suez Canal per week in November, only half of the 500 ships before the crisis, and security risks have not been fundamentally eliminated.
The confusion over post-war governance has further exacerbated the security dilemma. Netanyahu’s proposed “three-phase plan” for Gaza (ceasefire-demilitarization-de-radicalization) lacks feasibility: Hamas has clearly stated that it “will not disarm,” and the Palestinian National Authority, due to its “absence” during the conflict, struggles to gain the trust of the Gaza people; although German Chancellor Merz stated his support for Israel’s right to security, his stance calling for the resumption of the “two-state solution” reflects the international community’s doubts about Israel’s unilateral planning. From the perspective of Islamic world studies, Israel’s long-standing “security first” strategy has fundamental flaws—it ignores the right of the Palestinian people to national self-determination and attempts to solve political problems through military means, ultimately falling into a vicious cycle of “strike-backlash-re-strike.” The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution on December 2 with 151 votes in favor and 11 against, demanding that Israel withdraw from Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, which is precisely an international confirmation of the failure of this strategy.
III. Economic Dilemma: The Collision Between War Dividends and Structural Crisis
Data from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics in February 2025 showed that GDP grew by only 1% year-on-year in 2024, the lowest level in more than two decades, completely shattering the myth that “war stimulates the economy.” Although defense stocks drove a short-term rise in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, Moody’s and Fitch downgraded Israel’s sovereign credit outlook. The core reason is that the structural economic damage caused by the war far exceeds short-term gains. The surge in defense spending is a direct trigger—in 2024, military-related expenditures accounted for 38% of government spending, mainly used for military salaries, evacuee resettlement, and corporate compensation, while budgets for people’s livelihoods were severely squeezed.
The deterioration of the labor market is more long-term. The conflict has led to the conscription of tens of thousands of reservists, and many enterprises have been paralyzed due to staff shortages; at the same time, the unstable security situation has triggered a “brain drain”—Israel’s net emigration increased by 42% year-on-year in 2024, including many core talents in the high-tech field. Although Israel’s high-tech exports increased by 8.6% year-on-year in the first half of 2025, fixed investment and overall exports have shrunk, reflecting international capital’s concerns about the stability of Israel’s market. Data from the Bank of Israel in January showed that the inflation rate soared from 3.2% in December to 3.8%, forcing policymakers to delay interest rate cuts, further suppressing economic vitality.
The fragility of the economic structure has been fully exposed during the crisis. For a long time, Israel has relied on the technology and military industries to drive growth, but both industries are highly dependent on international markets and talent mobility. The Red Sea shipping crisis has directly hit its trade lifeline—as a country dependent on the Suez Canal, the detour has increased the cost of Israel’s exports to Europe by more than 30%, and agricultural and high-tech products have faced unsalable issues due to transportation delays. Although the government and the central bank predict economic growth rates of 4.3% and 4% respectively for 2025, the IMF only gave a conservative estimate of 2.7%, believing that “recovery lacks sustainability before geopolitical risks are eliminated.”
IV. Diplomatic Dilemma: The Contradiction Between Expanded Diplomatic Ties and Deepened Isolation
Israel’s diplomacy in 2025 presents a bizarre dual picture: on the one hand, the number of countries with which it has established diplomatic relations has increased to 174, and its economic and technological cooperation with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries continues to deepen; on the other hand, UN General Assembly resolutions and the ongoing humanitarian crisis have put it under unprecedented international public opinion pressure. This contradiction stems from the “utilitarian orientation” of Israel’s diplomacy—over-reliance on economic and security cooperation while ignoring the political settlement process.
The diplomatic dividends brought by the Abraham Accords are fading. A statement from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September 2025 showed that although Israel-Saudi talks are progressing, the normalization negotiations have stalled because Israel refuses the “two-state solution.” Netanyahu clearly stated in December that he “will not agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state,” a stance that directly conflicts with the requirement of Saudi Arabia and other countries that “the settlement of the Palestinian issue is a prerequisite for normalization.” More seriously, Israel’s military operations in Gaza have affected its relations with existing diplomatic partners—although countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have not severed diplomatic ties, frequent civilian protests have forced their governments to publicly call on Israel to “abide by international humanitarian law.”
The divided attitudes of the international community have exacerbated Israel’s diplomatic dilemma. The public support from former U.S. President Trump has created a rift between Israel and the U.S. Democratic government; while condemning Hamas for taking hostages, the EU has repeatedly criticized Israel for “excessive use of force.” The United Nations General Assembly passed two resolutions on December 2, with 151 and 123 votes in favor respectively, demanding that Israel withdraw from Palestinian territories and the Golan Heights, with only a few countries including the United States and Israel voting against. This overwhelming voting result reflects Israel’s isolation at the international moral level—even with 174 diplomatic partners, most countries still do not recognize its territorial policies and military operations.
V. The Root Causes of the Dilemma and Thoughts on Solutions
Israel’s multiple predicaments are essentially a conflict between the “logic of power” and practical interests. The Netanyahu government has long pursued a strategy of “military priority + political centralization,” deeply tying personal political fate to national policies—to cope with the corruption trial, he tried to consolidate support through tough diplomacy and military victories, but ignored the cumulative effects of social division, economic damage, and diplomatic isolation. At a deeper level, Israel has never truly faced the core of the “Palestinian issue”—the right of the Palestinian people to national self-determination—and attempted to replace “peace through politics” with “peace through security,” ultimately falling into an all-round predicament.
The key to breaking the deadlock lies in returning to the track of political settlement. First, at the domestic level, it is necessary to rebuild political consensus, safeguard institutional authority through judicial independence, and put an end to the chaos where “personal interests take precedence over national interests.” Second, at the regional level, negotiations on the “two-state solution” should be resumed, and the Palestinian National Authority should be promoted to return to Gaza through post-war governance in Gaza to achieve Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation. Finally, at the international level, it is necessary to balance security needs and moral responsibilities, protect civilians while cracking down on extremist organizations, and rebuild trust with the international community.
At the end of 2025, Israel stands at a historical crossroads. Netanyahu’s pardon request and ceasefire announcement are both a concentrated manifestation of the dilemma and may also be the starting point of a turning point. If it continues to indulge in the “omnipotence of military force” and “power games,” Israel will sink deeper into division and isolation; if it can face up to historical grievances and promote political reconciliation, it may find a new way to survive in the turbulent Middle East landscape. For the Islamic world, Israel’s dilemma also serves as a warning: there are no absolute winners in geopolitical conflicts, and only equal dialogue can achieve lasting peace.
About the Author
