In August 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu put forward the “full occupation of Gaza” plan at a Security Cabinet meeting, pushing the more than two-year-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a new strategic turning point. This plan is not a sudden idea but a complex product rooted in Israel’s more than half a century of geopolitical game experience in the Gaza Strip, combined with the political demands of the current “most right-wing government in history”. From Israel’s first military occupation of Gaza after the Third Middle East War in 1967, to the fleeting episode of the unilateral withdrawal plan in 2005, and then to the comprehensive escalation of military operations after the “Al-Aqsa Flood” incident in 2023, Israel’s control strategy for Gaza has always wavered between “security dominance” and “governance costs”. Combining the latest geopolitical developments and historical experience, this article analyzes the planning framework, implementation obstacles and in-depth risks of Israel’s occupation of Gaza, and reveals the strategic calculations and practical dilemmas behind this strategy.
Historical Mirror: The Cyclical Paradox of Occupation and Withdrawal
The history of Israel’s control over Gaza is essentially a history of the game between security needs and governance burdens. After the “Six-Day War” in 1967, Israel militarily occupied the Gaza Strip and began 38 years of direct rule. The occupation strategy during this period centered on “military control + settlement expansion”. By the time of withdrawal in 2005, Israel had established 21 settlements in Gaza, and about 8,000 Jewish settlers occupied 30% of Gaza’s high-quality land and 70% of its freshwater resources. This “controlling the whole area through key points” ruling model, although constructing a security barrier in the short term, gave rise to profound ethnic conflicts. After the outbreak of the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987, Hamas emerged from the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and its core demand was to resist Israel’s occupation rule. The growth of this organization directly confirmed the counter-effect of military occupation – as former Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff Barak later admitted: “Every checkpoint is a factory for manufacturing hatred.”
The “unilateral withdrawal plan” implemented by the Sharon government in 2005 seemed to be a rational avoidance of occupation costs, but in fact laid the groundwork for today’s conflict. After Israel withdrew all settlers and troops, it failed to establish an effective power transition mechanism, leading to a power vacuum in Gaza. In 2007, Hamas came to power through elections and took control of Gaza, forming a “split pattern” where the Palestine Liberation Organization controlled the West Bank and Hamas controlled Gaza. This political division made it difficult for Palestine to form a unified negotiating entity and also provided an excuse for Israel’s subsequent military intervention. It is worth noting that after the 2005 withdrawal, Israel still maintained indirect control over Gaza by blocking land borders, controlling sea lanes and air routes. This “semi-occupation” state could neither achieve complete security isolation nor avoid direct governance responsibilities, becoming a control model with the lowest cost but the highest risk.
After Hamas launched the “Al-Aqsa Flood” attack on October 7, 2023, domestic reflections on the “unilateral withdrawal” in Israel reached a climax. The right-wing government led by Netanyahu attributed this attack to the 2005 withdrawal policy, believing that “abandoning territory cannot bring peace”, which provided a strong domestic political foundation for its “full occupation” plan. Researcher Li Yanan from the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations pointed out that Israel’s current occupation plan is essentially different from the 1967 military occupation. The former is an extreme response to the security dilemma in the “post-withdrawal era”, emphasizing more on “phased control + demilitarization transformation” and attempting to break the historical cyclical paradox of “occupation-resistance-withdrawal”.
Strategic Framework: The “Three-Dimensional Planning” of Phased Occupation
Combining the Security Cabinet documents disclosed by the Israeli government in 2025 and the military operation trajectory, Israel’s occupation plan for Gaza presents a three-dimensional framework of “military control – governance restructuring – population reshaping”, and clearly defines the phased implementation path of “advancing north and consolidating south, and managing by districts”. This framework not only absorbs historical experience and lessons but also integrates the radical demands of the current right-wing government, forming a seemingly rigorous strategic design.
Military Dimension: Spatial Division Centered on “Buffer Zones”
Military control is the foundation of Israel’s occupation plan, and its core measure is to realize the spatial division of Gaza by establishing “strategic buffer zones”. In December 2024, Israeli Defense Minister Katz clearly announced during his inspection of the “Philadelphia Corridor” on the border between southern Gaza and Egypt that the Israeli military would establish a “permanent security buffer zone” in Gaza and reserve the “right to take any action anywhere”. According to satellite image analysis, by October 2025, the Israeli military had built an east-west military corridor in northern Gaza, completely isolating the northern end of Gaza from the central region, forming a “northern buffer zone” about 3 kilometers wide. Palestinian residential buildings in this area had been largely demolished and replaced with military fortifications and monitoring systems.
In the “full occupation plan” proposed by Netanyahu in August 2025, military control is divided into three phases: the first phase focuses on “taking over Gaza City” and eliminating Hamas’ core strongholds in the north, a goal that was approved by the Security Cabinet in the same month; the second phase extends the military presence to central Gaza, focusing on controlling strategic locations such as the Gaza Valley; the third phase blocks southern Gaza by controlling the “Philadelphia Corridor”, forming a pattern of “controlling the north and blocking the south”. It is worth noting that there are obvious differences within the Israeli military regarding this plan. The military is worried about “lack of practical combat plans” and “insufficient troop supplies”, especially in street battles in densely populated areas such as Gaza City, which may fall into an “endless war of attrition”. This difference is not a strategic opposition but a dispute over the implementation path – as Israeli Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer said: “The goal of full occupation is consistent, only the pace needs to be adjusted.”
Governance Dimension: The Dual Structure of “De-radicalization + Proxy Governance”
Compared with direct military occupation, Israel is more inclined to build a “Palestinians governing Palestinians” proxy governance system to reduce the cost of direct rule. In February 2024, Netanyahu clearly proposed in the post-war plan submitted to the Security Cabinet that the civil administration of Gaza would be responsible for “local organizations with administrative experience”, but these organizations must “not be affiliated with forces supporting terrorism”. This idea was further refined in the 2025 occupation plan. Israel plans to support pro-Israel tribal leaders and former Fatah members in the Gaza Strip to form a “Gaza Administrative Committee” responsible for people’s livelihood affairs such as education and medical care, while security sovereignty and border control are firmly in the hands of the Israeli military.
To ensure the effectiveness of proxy governance, Israel simultaneously implements a “de-radicalization” transformation plan covering education, religion and social fields. According to the plan, “anti-Israel content” will be deleted from Gaza’s school textbooks, religious institutions need to accept Israeli “ideological review”, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) will be closed, with its functions replaced by international organizations recognized by Israel. This “de-radicalization” is essentially cultural control, attempting to weaken Palestinian national identity by reconstructing the education system and religious narrative. However, from historical experience, such cultural control often backfires – during the 1967-2005 occupation period, Israel tried to strengthen its rule by restricting Palestinian national education, but instead gave rise to stronger nationalist sentiments.
In the distribution of governance resources, Israel adopts a “differentiated supply” strategy, which echoes the U.S.-led “red-green zone” plan. According to U.S. military planning documents exposed in October 2025, Gaza will be divided into “green zones” and “red zones”. Green zones will be jointly managed by the Israeli military and international forces and prioritized for reconstruction, while red zones will remain in ruins and their governance will be suspended. Israel has shown positive recognition of this plan, which essentially intends to win over pro-Israel groups through resource inclination and create divisions in Palestinian society. However, the core obstacle facing this strategy is the shortage of funds – although the United States has proposed the “Gaza Reconstruction and Economic Transformation Trust Fund”, it has clearly stated that it will not bear the main funding responsibility, and the international community, due to opposition to Israel’s occupation, can hardly form effective financial support.
Population Dimension: Structural Reshaping Centered on “Forced Migration”
Population structure reshaping is the most controversial link in Israel’s occupation plan, and its core goal is to reduce the density of Palestinian population in Gaza and lower long-term governance costs. Data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics in January 2025 showed that affected by the conflict and migration, Gaza’s population had decreased from 2.23 million at the beginning of 2024 to 2.1 million, a year-on-year decrease of 6%, and Israel’s goal is to further reduce this number to below 1.5 million through long-term planning. The main means to achieve this goal is a combined strategy of “induced migration + restricted return”.
In terms of “induced migration”, Israel and the United States jointly launched a “voluntary migration plan”, providing 5,000 US dollars in resettlement fees, 4 years of rent subsidies and 12 months of food security for residents who choose to leave Gaza. However, in actual operation, this plan has obvious coercive nature – the Israeli military has designated 86% of Gaza as “uninhabitable areas” by expanding military restricted zones and cutting off people’s livelihood supplies, forcing residents to choose between “migration or starvation”. A survey by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees showed that among the 400,000 Palestinians who left Gaza in the first half of 2025, only 12% were “voluntary migrants”, and the rest were forced to be displaced.
For residents who choose to stay, Israel implements centralized management through “security zone control”. According to the plan, the remaining Palestinians will be restricted to prefabricated housing areas accounting for only 14% of Gaza’s area, with a per capita living area of less than 3 square meters, and power supply for no more than 4 hours a day, with cholera and other infectious diseases rampant. This “concentration camp-style management model” essentially exerts continuous pressure through the deterioration of living conditions, forcing residents to eventually choose to migrate. More far-reaching is Israel’s settlement reconstruction plan in northern Gaza – in August 2025, the Israeli government approved the reconstruction of 3 Jewish settlements around Gaza City, which is the first time that settlement construction has been restarted in Gaza since the 2005 unilateral withdrawal, marking Israel’s attempt to achieve permanent control over Gaza through population replacement.
Practical Dilemma: In-depth Game between Strategic Calculations and Implementation Obstacles
Although Israel has constructed a seemingly rigorous occupation plan, from the current implementation situation, this strategy faces structural obstacles in three dimensions: military, political and international public opinion. These obstacles are not short-term difficulties but are rooted in the essential attributes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, making Israel’s occupation plan fall into a vicious circle of “the stricter the control, the stronger the resistance”.
The core dilemma at the military level is the “imbalance between security needs and governance capabilities”. Although the Israeli Defense Forces have controlled 75% of Gaza’s land, Hamas maintains its resistance capabilities through tunnel warfare and guerrilla warfare. Internal assessments by the Israeli military show that completely eliminating Hamas will take at least 10 years and require more than 50 billion US dollars in military investment, while the current reserve personnel of the Israeli military have shown serious war weariness, and the troop replenishment rate has dropped by 40% compared with 2023. More critically, the humanitarian disaster caused by the occupation is backfiring on Israel’s security – the tragic data of 67,000 deaths and 160,000 injuries in Gaza in 2025 has won broader sympathy for the “resistance front”, and the attack frequency of forces such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi armed forces in Yemen on Israel has increased by 3 times compared with 2023.
The core political contradiction is the “division between right-wing demands and domestic consensus”. Netanyahu’s “full occupation” plan mainly relies on the support of far-right parties, but there is strong opposition within Israel. A September 2025 poll showed that 58% of Israeli citizens believed that “full occupation will lead to an endless war”, and 45% supported resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue through negotiations. The protest activities of the families of the abducted persons have continued to ferment – in October 2025, thousands of Israeli citizens rallied in front of the Prime Minister’s Office, accusing Netanyahu’s occupation plan of making the “survival hope of 120 abducted persons slim”. This group has become a key force shaking the government’s ruling foundation.
The pressure at the international public opinion level shows a trend of “allies turning against each other and increasing isolation”. Since 2025, 11 traditional U.S. allies including Britain, France and Canada have successively recognized the State of Palestine, making the number of countries recognizing Palestine reach 158, accounting for more than 81% of UN member states. Even the United States, Israel’s most steadfast ally, has begun to keep a distance from Israel – in October 2025, the United States abstained from voting on the UN Security Council resolution on a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza, which was the first position shift since the outbreak of the conflict in 2023. More damaging is the economic sanctions from the international community – the EU has suspended 7 cooperation projects with Israel, and Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia have announced the freezing of all economic and trade exchanges with Israel, leading to a 2.3% decline in Israel’s GDP growth rate in 2025.
Conclusion: The Historical Inevitability Behind the Occupation Dilemma
From 1967 to 2025, Israel’s control strategy for Gaza has always wavered between “military toughness” and “political compromise”, but has never been able to break through the core paradox of the “security dilemma” – trying to achieve security through occupation, but instead spawning more security threats due to occupation. The “full occupation” plan currently implemented by the Netanyahu government is essentially a misinterpretation of historical experience by the right-wing government, equating military superiority with governance capabilities and simplifying ethnic conflicts into security issues, which will eventually fall into a vicious circle of “the more you occupy, the less secure you are”.
The “New York Declaration” adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2025 reaffirmed that the “two-state solution” is the only feasible path to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The core of this solution is to recognize the right of the Palestinian people to establish a state and realize the peaceful coexistence of Israel and Palestine on the basis of the 1967 borders. The fundamental reason why Israel’s occupation plan is difficult to succeed is that it violates this historical trend – in the era of globalization, any act of territorial expansion through military occupation and population replacement will inevitably be opposed by the international community and condemned by history.
The fate of Gaza is essentially a touchstone for the balance of power in the Middle East and international fairness and justice. If Israel continues to implement the current occupation plan, it will not only fall into an endless quagmire of war but also completely lose its political legitimacy in the Middle East. Only by abandoning the fantasy of occupation and returning to the negotiation track of the “two-state solution can real peace be brought to the people of both Israel and Palestine. As the representative of Palestine to the United Nations said: “Security without justice is false security, and peace without sovereignty is humiliating peace” – this assertion is the historical destiny that Israel’s occupation plan cannot escape.
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