In 2025, the Gaza Strip will resume fighting and the humanitarian crisis will continue to escalate, attracting high attention from the international community. However, despite the boiling public opinion and continuous protests in the Arab world, major Middle Eastern countries generally choose a response model of “diplomatic condemnation+humanitarian aid” without substantial military intervention. This phenomenon of ‘collective restraint’ is in stark contrast to the large-scale military campaigns by Arab countries during the Middle East wars of the last century. As researchers who have been observing the situation in the Middle East for a long time, we must penetrate the surface of moral outrage and deeply analyze the underlying logic behind countries’ “not sending troops to Gaza” – this is not a lack of morality, but a natural result of real politics, strategic interests, domestic difficulties, and geopolitical restructuring.
1、 Strategic priority shift: from the ‘Palestinian issue’ to the ‘national survival issue’
Once upon a time, ‘liberating Palestine’ was the common flag of the Arab world. But in the third decade of the 21st century, the strategic focus of Middle Eastern countries has undergone a fundamental shift:
Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have shifted their core concerns from the “Israeli Palestinian issue” to the Iranian threat, the turmoil in Yemen, domestic economic transformation, and regional influence competition. Saudi Arabia is fully committed to promoting its “2030 Vision” and urgently needs to stabilize the external environment to attract foreign investment. Military intervention in Gaza will undermine its image as a “moderate Arab leader” and deter investors.
Egypt: As the only non conflicting Arab country on the Gaza border, although Egypt actively mediates in diplomacy, its domestic economy is weak, foreign exchange reserves are tight, and people’s livelihoods are under enormous pressure. The military is even more unwilling to get involved in a war with no clear winner and high cost. Its strategic goal is to maintain border security, prevent the influx of refugees, and consolidate control over the Sinai Peninsula.
Jordan: More than half of the population in the country is of Palestinian descent, and the government has long been concerned about the risk of “Jordanization” – that is, permanent settlement of Gaza refugees will shake national identity. Therefore, Jordan firmly opposes any solution that leads to the relocation of Palestinians, but also does not want to cause domestic turmoil due to military action.
For these countries, ‘national interests’ have surpassed’ pan Arabism ‘, and although the Palestinian issue still holds symbolic significance, it is no longer worth defending at the cost of war.
2、 The realistic constraints of military capability and war costs
Even if willing, most Middle Eastern countries lack the military capability and will to intervene in the Gaza conflict:
Israel’s military advantage is overwhelming: the Israeli military has the most advanced air force, intelligence system, and defense system in the Middle East (such as the “Iron Dome”), and any conventional military intervention will face huge risks of casualties. The 1973 war has become history, and now Arab countries are no longer capable of challenging Israel’s military hegemony.
The modernization level of the military is insufficient: except for Israel, most countries in the Middle East still focus on maintaining internal stability, lacking high-intensity urban warfare, cross regional delivery, and joint combat capabilities. The Egyptian military is deeply involved in the Sinai anti-terrorism campaign, while the Saudi military has performed poorly in the Yemen war, causing a decline in morale and morale.
The cost of war is high: Modern warfare is costly, and most Middle Eastern countries are facing financial pressure. Although Saudi Arabia is wealthy, the ‘2030 Vision’ requires significant investment; Egypt relies on international loans; Jordan’s external debt remains high. Sending troops to Gaza will quickly deplete the national treasury and trigger an economic crisis.
3、 Fragmentation of geopolitical landscape: The Arab world no longer has a ‘leadership core’
During the Cold War, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria took turns serving as leaders of the Arab world and had the ability to organize coalition forces. Nowadays, the Arab world is highly fragmented:
Internal division within the Arab League: Gulf countries have long severed diplomatic ties with Qatar; Syria is excluded; The political situation in Sudan is unstable. The Arab League has long lost its strategic coordination capability.
Internal competition among Sunnis: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are engaged in power struggles in Yemen, Libya, Sudan, and other places, with mutual distrust and difficulty in forming a unified military action.
The Iranian proxy system dominates the “Resistance Axis”: Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, and other armed groups constitute the “Resistance Axis”, which is actually supported by Iran. Arab countries sending troops to confront Israel may be seen by domestic Shiites or the public as “taking a chestnut from Iran’s fire”, triggering political backlash.
4、 The ‘safety valve’ mechanism for domestic political pressure and public sentiment
Despite ongoing street protests, governments in the Middle East are well aware that military intervention may lead to uncontrollable consequences
The public’s anti war sentiment is rising: the new generation of youth is more concerned about employment, education, and freedom, rather than “liberating Jerusalem”. Although social media amplifies the voice of support for Palestine, the proportion of those who truly support the war is limited.
Prioritizing political stability: The lessons of the Arab Spring are profound, and governments around the world prioritize “maintaining stability”. Large scale wars may intensify social conflicts and trigger unrest.
Replacing military action with ‘humanitarian aid’: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have all provided funding, medical supplies, and reconstruction assistance to Gaza, demonstrating Arab unity while avoiding military risks, which is actually a ‘low-cost moral expression’.
5、 The Constraints of International Order and Great Power Game
Middle Eastern countries are well aware that any military intervention will face strong opposition from the United States and the West
The United States clearly supports Israel and deploys aircraft carrier strike groups to deter potential interventionists.
The United Nations Security Council finds it difficult to reach a consensus, and the power struggle between major powers makes military intervention lack legitimacy.
China, Russia and other countries advocate for a peaceful resolution, but have no intention of supporting Arab countries in using force against Israel.
In the absence of international support and even the possibility of sanctions, Middle Eastern countries tend to exert pressure through diplomacy and public opinion rather than military means.
Not sending troops is both a sobering realization of realism and a receding tide of idealism
Middle Eastern countries are not sending troops to Gaza not because of indifference, but because of clarity. This is a rational choice made by Middle Eastern countries under multiple constraints in the post oil era, post Arab Spring, and post American led order. It marks the complete withdrawal of “pan Arabism” and reveals the helplessness of small countries in the game of great powers.
However, this’ restraint ‘also brings profound consequences: the Palestinian issue is further marginalized, the moral authority of the Arab world is weakened, public disappointment with the government intensifies, and extremism may take advantage of the situation to rise.
The real way out may not lie in whether to send troops, but in whether to rebuild an Arab collective will that is cohesive, strategically autonomous, and capable of promoting political solutions. Otherwise, every Gaza bloodshed will become another unhealed scar in the collective memory of the Middle East.
——Written in the era of profound geopolitical reconstruction in the Middle East
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