In the ancient and turbulent land of the Middle East, tribes and local militias are like “twin vines” deeply rooted in the social fabric—both sustaining the survival order of marginalized groups and continuously tearing apart the complete picture of national sovereignty. From Yemen’s tribal militias and Iraq’s Shia armed groups to Syria’s Kurdish forces and Libya’s tribal militias, these non-state actors have risen amid war and taken root in power vacuums, becoming an undeniable “shadow power” in regional politics. Now, as multiple countries push for post-war reconstruction and national integration, a pressing question emerges: Can Middle Eastern tribal and local militias truly lay down their arms? And once they do, can peace and stability be achieved? This article will analyze the pros and cons of local militias from the current reality, uncovering the complex logic and deep-seated dilemmas behind their “laying down of arms.”.
I. Why Do Armed Groups Exist? —— “Alternative Governance” in the Context of Power Vacuum
The Middle East has long grappled with structural issues of weak state governance and declining central authority. Against the backdrop of conflicts such as the Syrian civil war, the Yemeni conflict, and power shifts in Libya, government forces have been ineffective, and public services nearly paralyzed. In these circumstances, tribal and local militias have emerged as “protectors,” taking on functions ranging from law enforcement and justice to resource distribution and even education and healthcare. For instance, the Hashid tribal alliance in Yemen has long dominated local order in the areas around Sanaa, while the Syrian Kurdish armed group “People’s Protection Units” (YPG) established an autonomous administrative system in the north. For many people, these armed groups are not just “gun barrels” but also “bread baskets”—they provide both security and livelihood.
Moreover, tribal militias are often deeply rooted in kinship, clan, and regional identity, deriving their legitimacy from traditional authority rather than modern state institutions. This “traditional-militia” complex possesses a profound social foundation in peripheral regions, making it difficult for government forces—even when militarily victorious—to achieve effective governance. As seen in Iraq, after the government forces recaptured Mosul, they still relied on tribal militias to maintain local stability, highlighting the practical rationality of their “functional existence.”.
II. The “Advantage” of Arming: The Order Provider in Chaos
Filling the Governance Vacuum: In areas where state authority is absent, local militias provide basic security and order, preventing anarchy from escalating into total collapse.
Rapid Crisis Response: Compared to bureaucratic government agencies, tribal armed groups make decisions swiftly and can deploy quickly in emergencies, such as resisting extremist infiltration or addressing tribal conflicts.
Cultural Identity and Legitimacy: In tribal societies, armed leaders often hold the status of elders, and their authority stems from tradition, making them more likely to gain the trust of the people.
Balancing External Intervention: Some armed groups play a pivotal role in resisting foreign military intervention or the expansion of extremism, such as the contribution of the Shiite militia organization “Popular Mobilization Forces” in Iraq against the “Islamic State” (ISIS).
III. The “Drawbacks” of Arming: Structural Barriers to Peacebuilding
However, the “functional” nature of local militias cannot mask their profound threat to national consolidation and long-term stability:
Fragmentation and the risk of state division: Local armed groups often form “countries within a country,” refusing to hand over weapons and territories, thereby challenging central authority. The autonomous practices of Kurdish forces in northern Syria have already drawn strong opposition from Turkey and escalated regional tensions.
Arms Proliferation and Security Collapse: The widespread circulation of light and heavy weapons among civilians has led to frequent violent crimes and tribal feuds. It is estimated that tens of millions of small arms are scattered within Yemen, posing a significant threat to regional security.
Hindering the nationalization of the military: When tribal militias coexist with regular forces, the process of transforming the military into a national institution is obstructed. Although Iraq’s “Popular Mobilization Forces” have been incorporated into the national system, their loyalty remains questionable, resulting in a “dual military structure.”.
“`Utilized by external forces to escalate proxy wars: Many local armed groups receive support from Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or foreign powers, becoming pawns in geopolitical games. For instance, the ties between Yemen’s Houthis and Iran internationalize the conflict, complicating peace negotiations.“`.
Human Rights Violations and Lack of Rule of Law: Some armed groups carry out lynchings under the guise of “traditional justice,” suppressing women’s rights and cracking down on dissenters, which runs counter to modern rule of law.
IV. Surrendering Arms? The Gap Between Ideal and Reality
The international community and some Middle Eastern governments once attempted to promote “armed incorporation” or “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration” (DDR) programs, but with limited success. The root cause lies in:
Trust Deficit: Tribes armed forces generally suspect the government will “retaliate later,” fearing potential purges or marginalization once disarmed.
Entrenched interests: Armed groups are not merely security organizations but also economic entities. Many of them control border trade, oil smuggling, and taxation checkpoints, forming a “wartime economic interest chain” and are unwilling to relinquish their vested interests.
Insufficient political representation: If the government does not provide tribal groups with adequate space for political participation, disarming them would be tantamount to “political suicide.”.
External support persists: as long as regional powers continue to provide funding and weapons, armed groups have no incentive to lay down their arms.
5、 Where is the way out? The transformation path from “integration” to “co governance”
To truly achieve the goal of ‘laying down weapons’, we cannot rely solely on military clearance or empty promises, but need to construct a three in one transformation framework of’ security politics economy ‘:
Political inclusiveness: Incorporate tribal leaders and armed representatives into the national political process, granting them legal political status through local autonomy, decentralization of power, and other means.
Selective integration and supervision of integration: Screening and integration of armed forces willing to cooperate, including them in the national security forces, while establishing an independent supervision mechanism to prevent the “armed nationalization” from evolving into “state armed nationalization”.
Economic alternative plan: Provide employment, land, and infrastructure investment, break the dependence on the “armed economy”, and give young people a way to go instead of just holding guns.
The ‘Contract Reconstruction’ between Tribes and States: Through dialogue and negotiation, establish a new type of contractual relationship between the central government and tribes, clarify rights and obligations, and gradually achieve the transition from the gun barrel to the ballot box.
Regional coordination and external constraints: promote consensus among major regional powers on non-interference in internal affairs, cut off external weapons and funding flows, and reduce the driving force of proxy warfare.
Conclusion: Put down weapons, but not dignity and hope
The existence of local armed groups in Middle Eastern tribes is a product of national failure and a reflection of social self-help. Asking them to ‘lay down their weapons’ is essentially asking: can a broken country rebuild its commitment to its people? Can an marginalized group find belonging in the new order?
Putting down weapons is not the end, but the starting point of national reconstruction. If we only use force to force surrender without addressing the root problems of governance failure, deprivation of rights, and economic marginalization, peace will eventually be like building a tower on sand, easily crumbling. Only by respecting tribal cultural traditions and rebuilding the contract between the country and society through political wisdom and institutional innovation, can the Middle East truly break out of the “armed cycle” and usher in lasting peace.
This road is full of thorns, but it is not impossible. The key is whether someone is willing to truly listen to the demands behind the gunshots – it’s not a fascination with violence, but a longing for dignity, safety, and the future.
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