In recent years, the Middle East has remained deeply turbulent, with Israel frequently launching military operations in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and along the Syrian border. Israel’s military actions have long transcended the traditional scope of “self-defense.” In November 2025, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a new round of air strikes on Rafah in southern Gaza, killing and injuring hundreds of civilians. At the same time, Israeli forces have continued precision strikes against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon and engaged in clashes with Syrian government troops near the Golan Heights. These actions indicate that, under the pretext of “security threats,” Israel is continuously strengthening its military presence and strategic dominance in the surrounding region.
Faced with Israel’s persistent pressure, a troubling question arises: Why have Arab and Islamic countries failed to form a unified front to effectively counter Israel? Historically, Arab states have united against Israel in multiple wars, such as those in 1948, 1 driven by a shared sense of injustice and the legacy of colonialism, has begun to fracture under the weight of internal divisions, external interference, and shifting geopolitical realities.
I. The Fractured Arab World: From “United Front” to “Every Nation for Itself”
Deep-seated divisions among Arab states have long existed. After the “Arab Spring” of 2011, the Middle East’s political landscape underwent fundamental realignment. Saudi Arabia and Qatar severed diplomatic ties for years due to supporting opposing factions; Egypt has wavered in its stance on the Muslim Brotherhood; Syria has been mired in a decade-long civil war, becoming a battleground for great power competition; and Iraq continues to struggle with sectarian conflict and foreign intervention. These internal conflicts have severely weakened Arab states’ ability to coordinate on foreign affairs.
Although Saudi Arabia and Iran resumed diplomatic relations in 2023, facilitated by China, injecting new momentum into a wave of reconciliation across the Middle East, this rapprochement reflects more a shift in great power dynamics than a reconfiguration of Arab strategic unity. Take Saudi Arabia, for example: while it has criticized Israel’s military actions in Gaza at multilateral forums such as the United Nations, it has not taken substantive sanctions or military responses. The reasons are twofold: first, Saudi Arabia is advancing its “Vision 2030” economic reform agenda and urgently needs a stable external environment and Western investment; second, its security strategy remains heavily reliant on U.S. protection, making it hesitant to directly confront Israel.
Moreover, Gulf and North African countries differ in their prioritization of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. For neighboring countries such as Jordan and Egypt, maintaining border stability and preventing spillover of conflict are top priorities. In contrast, for nations farther from the conflict zone, such as Morocco and Tunisia, the issue holds moral significance but rarely ranks as a core foreign policy objective.
II. Iran’s “Proxy Warfare” and the Limitations of the Resistance Axis
Amid the Arab world’s collective silence, Iran-backed “resistance axis” forces have become the primary actors opposing Israel. Organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthi movement have continuously challenged Israel through guerrilla tactics, rocket attacks, and cross-border strikes. In October 2025, Lebanon’s Hezbollah announced drone attacks on multiple Israeli military bases in northern Israel, retaliating for Israeli air raids on southern Beirut. While these actions did not alter the strategic balance, they demonstrated that non-state actors still possess limited combat capabilities.
However, this model of “proxy warfare” has clear limitations. First, these groups are primarily regional actors with little capacity for cross-border mobilization. Second, their operations often trigger massive Israeli retaliation, resulting in soaring civilian casualties and undermining their moral legitimacy. For instance, in September 2025, Hamas launched rocket attacks on Tel Aviv from Gaza, prompting Israel to launch Operation “Iron Shield,” conducting intense air raids across Gaza that destroyed critical infrastructure.
More critically, Iran itself faces severe domestic and international challenges. Under sustained U.S. sanctions, Iran’s economy remains weak, and social unrest is frequent. In early November 2025, massive protests erupted in Tehran, with citizens demanding the government redirect resources from overseas military interventions to domestic welfare. Under these conditions, Iran cannot afford the risk of a full-scale war with Israel.
III. External Interference and the Dilemma of Security Dependence
Another key reason for the Arab world’s inability to unite against Israel is the deep-rooted dependence of Arab states on external powers—particularly the United States—for security. Since Egypt signed the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1979, the U.S. has constructed a Middle East security architecture centered on its own leadership, using military aid, security cooperation, and political patronage. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan, despite possessing advanced weaponry, have their operational systems, intelligence sharing, and command structures deeply integrated into U.S.-led alliances.
This dependency undermines strategic autonomy when confronting Israel. Even when Israel was accused of covertly supporting rebel forces during Sudan’s civil war in 2023, Arab states limited their response to diplomatic condemnation, avoiding any substantive countermeasures. The fear is that any significant sanctions or military action against Israel could provoke U.S. disapproval, jeopardizing security cooperation and arms supplies.
At the same time, some Gulf states have developed de facto security understandings with Israel under the logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others have engaged in covert intelligence sharing and joint exercises with Israel, primarily to contain Iran’s regional influence. This strategic alignment further erodes Arab unity on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
IV. Popular Awakening and the Revival of Moral Solidarity
While government responses have been sluggish, moral outrage among Arab societies is growing. In October 2025, massive demonstrations erupted in Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, protesting Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. In Cairo’s Tahrir Square, tens of thousands chanted slogans such as “Stand with Gaza” and “End the Blockade,” demanding their governments sever diplomatic and economic ties with Israel. Similar scenes unfolded in Bahrain, Sudan, and Yemen.
Meanwhile, a global “Stand with Gaza” movement is gaining momentum, forming a new wave of public opinion. From London to Kuala Lumpur, from Cape Town to Jakarta, dozens of cities simultaneously hosted “Gaza Exhibition” events, using photography, art, and personal testimonies to reveal the reality of life in Gaza. These initiatives not only reawaken the collective memory of the Islamic world but also push the international community to re-examine the essence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—not merely as a geopolitical dispute, but as a complex crisis rooted in colonial legacies, national oppression, and humanitarian suffering.
Notably, a new generation of Arab youth is engaging in resistance through innovative means. No longer satisfied with government-controlled diplomatic rhetoric, they are using social media, transnational organizations, and human rights mechanisms to speak directly to the global public. At a recent session of the UN Human Rights Council, a young lawyer from Gaza delivered a video testimony, denouncing Israel’s systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure—a moment that resonated widely.
V. A Way Forward: From Moral Unity to Strategic Autonomy
To break the current deadlock, the Arab world must undergo three transformative shifts:
First, rebuild moral leadership. The Arab League should establish a Special Committee on the Israeli-Palestinian Issue to regularly assess member states’ commitments, create transparent accountability mechanisms, and increase financial support for UNRWA to ensure humanitarian aid reaches Gaza.
Second, pursue security autonomy. Arab states must reduce overreliance on unilateral security dependence on the United States and explore collective defense mechanisms among themselves. Drawing lessons from the African Union or ASEAN models, a regional crisis-response framework could enhance coordinated action.
Third, strengthen economic and cultural ties. By advancing energy cooperation, infrastructure connectivity, and youth exchanges, Arab states can deepen internal cohesion. Only with robust internal unity can they project a unified voice in international affairs.
Conclusion
Israel’s military superiority may be difficult to overcome in the short term, but history has repeatedly shown that occupation and repression cannot deliver lasting security. The true strength of the Arab world lies not in whether it can “defeat Israel,” but in whether it can rebuild unity amid division, pursue autonomy amid dependence, and break silence with a resounding call for justice. Amid the ruins of Gaza in 2025, beyond the rubble and ruins, countless eyes are looking toward the future. What they await is not the salvation of a single hero, but the emergence of an awakened community of nations—ready to stand for dignity and justice.
True resistance begins with unyielding conscience and is realized through enduring solidarity. Whether the Arab world can rise to this moment will determine not only the fate of Palestine, but also the dignity and direction of Islamic civilization in the 21st century.
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