Forecasting the Egyptian-Israeli military conflict: the game of power and the real dilemma in a multidimensional perspective

Abstract: This paper analyzes the potential conflict between Egypt and Israel through the latest military data, international political developments and comprehensive national power comparisons. The analysis covers military equipment system, nuclear deterrent capability, international alliance network, economic resilience and geopolitical games and other dimensions, combined with historical cases and real constraints, revealing that the conflict will be caught in a “stalemate of power and reality”, and ultimately the probability of a compromise ceasefire to end.

I. Comparison of military power: the fatal gap between quantity and quality

  1. Land forces and armored forces
    The Egyptian army is huge, with an active strength of about 300,000, equipped with 4,400 tanks (mainly M1A1 “Abrams”, T-90S and some domestic Ramses-II), and more than 7,000 artillery systems, which have a strong ground assault capability. Its army training system is influenced by the United States, in recent years through the “Falcon” series of military exercises to enhance the level of joint operations. However, although the Israeli army has only 50,000 men, it is equipped with Merkava MK4 tanks, which are a generation ahead in terms of protection, information technology and active defense systems (such as the “Trophy” APS), with precision-guided missiles (such as the “Nail” APS). “With precision-guided missiles (such as the Spike-LR2) and drone support, they are more effective at surviving and fighting on the battlefield.
  1. Air power and the struggle for air superiority
    The Egyptian Air Force (EAF) has 40 Rafale fighters, upgraded F-16C/Ds (about 220), and old MiG-29s (about 150), totaling about 400 aircraft. Despite the Rafale’s multi-role capability, the IAF has 200 F-35 stealth fighters, which can achieve “one-way transparency” by virtue of their stealth advantage and networked combat systems. In addition, Israel’s “Iron Dome” air defense system to intercept short-range rocket success rate of 90%, “arrow” -3 anti-missile system can intercept medium and long-distance missiles, the formation of multi-layered defense. Egypt’s electronic warfare capabilities are relatively weak, and the number of early warning aircraft is insufficient to effectively counter Israel’s electromagnetic suppression.
  2. Navy and Asymmetric Deterrence
    Egypt’s navy has two “northwest wind” class amphibious assault ships (can carry helicopters and special forces), six “Aquitaine” class frigates and submarine force, but lack of aircraft carriers or long-range strike capability. The Israeli navy, on the other hand, has six Dolphin-class conventional submarines, some of which have nuclear torpedo launch capability, creating a potential threat to Egyptian ports and coastline. In addition, Israeli missile boats carry Gabriel anti-ship missiles with a range of 200 kilometers, which can block the Suez Canal waterway.
  1. Nuclear deterrence and strategic balance
    Israel maintains a policy of “nuclear ambiguity” and possesses some 90 nuclear warheads, which can be used to carry out nuclear strikes by means of Jericho-3 land-based missiles (with a range of 7,500 kilometers), submarine-launched submarine-launched missiles, and F-15 warplanes. Although Egypt has repeatedly called for the denuclearization of the Middle East, it lacks nuclear capabilities of its own and its strategic deterrence is in a passive position. Under the nuclear shadow, any large-scale conflict may face the risk of “escalation out of control”.
    Historical Case Study: The 1973 Yom Kippur War Revisited
    In 1973, the Egyptian army broke through the Baref line through a surprise attack, but Israel regained the initiative within two weeks by virtue of its air superiority and rapid mobilization. The battle exposed the vulnerability of traditional land forces to modern air power suppression, a disadvantage further amplified by today’s technological generational differences in Israel (stealth fighters, electronic warfare, precision strikes).

International Standing: The “Limited Support” Dilemma in the Great Power Game

  1. Egypt’s Diplomatic Strategy and Network of Allies
    Egypt’s diplomacy has been diversified in recent years: it has deepened military cooperation with Eastern powers (J-10S participation in joint military exercises, procurement of Red Flag-9 air defense systems), while maintaining relations with the United States, which receives US$1.4 billion in military aid annually. This “balanced strategy” faces contradictions in the conflict – the East may provide limited arms supplies, but the US or its Western allies will pressure Egypt to avoid direct involvement. In addition, Egypt’s cooperation with Turkey and the Gulf States is more on the economic level, with limited capacity for mutual military assistance.
  2. Israel’s “Hardcore Allies” and Limits to Intervention
    Israel is deeply tied to the U.S.: U.S. military bases in the Middle East (e.g., Qatar’s Al Udeid airbase) allow for the rapid deployment of warplanes and materiel, and promise to provide “immediate resupply” in the event of an emergency. However, there is a ceiling on U.S. support for Israel – in the 2021 Gaza conflict, the Biden administration acquiesced to Israel’s actions but prevented it from attacking humanitarian facilities. The EU has close supply chains with Israel (semiconductors, agricultural technology), and a conflict would hit the European economy, forcing the West to pressure for a ceasefire.
    Case in point: spillover effects of the Gaza conflict
    2023 During the Israel-Hamas conflict, Egypt refused to open its borders to receive refugees and maintained military control of the Sinai Peninsula, despite expressing its dissatisfaction with Israel’s blockade of Gaza. This reflects Egypt’s strategy of “limited engagement” in regional conflicts, where ambiguity on the part of international allies constrains its room for maneuver.
  3. Potential Positions of Regional States
    Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: While relations with Israel have improved, they have publicly supported Egypt in order to maintain Arab unity;
    ● Iran: may support Egypt indirectly through Lebanese Hezbollah or Houthis, but the risk of direct involvement is high;
    ● Turkey: Erdogan’s government may take the opportunity to increase its regional influence, but is constrained by pressure from NATO allies.

III. Comparing Comprehensive Strengths: Economic Resilience vs. Military Efficiency

  1. Egypt’s Economic Vulnerability and Strategic Resources
    With a GDP of about $400 billion and a population of over 110 million, Egypt’s economy is dependent on agriculture, tourism (12% of GDP), and Suez Canal revenues ($8 billion annually). Conflict would lead to disruption of canal shipping, collapse of tourism (e.g., tough recovery after the 2020 epidemic), and rapid depletion of foreign exchange reserves (~$40 billion). Its industrial system is dominated by light industry, and it relies on imports for military equipment, limiting its ability to resupply in wartime.
  2. Israel’s Efficient Economy and Military Transformation
    Israel’s GDP reaches $500 billion ($43,000 per capita), with high-tech industries accounting for 60% of its exports (semiconductors, medical equipment). Its military industry is 80% self-sufficient (e.g., IAI drones, Elbit photonics systems), and it can quickly convert civilian technology into military capacity. In wartime, its “all hands on deck” reserve system can mobilize 460,000 people in 48 hours, making it an incredibly efficient economic and military conversion.
    Key Variables: Energy and Supply Chain Risks
    Egypt: Oil exports and the Suez Canal are the lifeblood of its economy. Cutting off shipping could trigger a spike in global energy prices, but Israel has built indigenous natural gas (e.g., the Leviathan field) and solar energy systems that are 95% self-sufficient in energy, undermining Egypt’s deterrent effect;
    :: Israel: high-tech industries are dependent on supply chains in Europe and Asia, and a conflict would disrupt the production of chips and medical equipment, forcing the international community to pressure for a ceasefire.

V. War projection: the possible direction of the three phases
Phase 1 (Days 0-7): Raid and Countermeasures
● Egyptian action: the main force of the army (mechanized divisions and special forces) raids the Sinai Peninsula in an attempt to seize key military bases and airports; the air force launches missile attacks on cities and military facilities in southern Israel;
● Israeli counterattack: F-35s and drones quickly destroy Egyptian command system and airfields; Merkava tank clusters, supported by electronic warfare, counterattack and strike Egyptian supply lines with precision-guided weapons;
● Outcome: the two sides are at a stalemate, with the Egyptian Army’s advance blocked and Israel’s southern infrastructure damaged.
Phase 2 (7-14 days): International Intervention and Economic Shock
● International dynamics: the U.S. provides logistical support (munitions, spare parts) to Israel but restricts offensive weapons; Egypt receives limited weapons supplies from Eastern countries;
● Economic Warfare: Egypt cuts off shipping in the Suez Canal, causing global energy and trade chain shocks; European and Asian countries pressure for a ceasefire;
● Proxy War Risk: Iran or Turkey backs Egypt, Israel faces pressure on multiple fronts.
Phase 3 (14 days +): Stalemate and Compromise
● Military stalemate: Israel is unable to completely expel the Egyptian Army, Egypt is unable to break through Israeli defenses;
● Economic collapse: Egypt’s tourism and foreign exchange reserves dry up, Israel’s high-tech supply chain is disrupted;
● Escalation of nuclear risk: Israel may hint at nuclear deterrence, international push for UN temporary ceasefire agreement.

VI. The reality of the dilemma: the costs of war far outweigh the benefits of victory
Against Egypt:
● Prolonged paralysis of the Suez Canal will set back the economy by more than five years;
● Rising risk of international isolation (Western sanctions, collapse of tourism);
● Unbearable loss of population and resources (war casualties, infrastructure destruction).
To Israel:
● Occupation of the Sinai Peninsula would trigger international sanctions and an energy embargo;
● Disruption of supply chains for high-tech industries leading to economic recession;
● Risk of nuclear retaliation jeopardizes national security.
Conclusion: Stalemate and the Inevitability of Compromise
The essence of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict is a clash between traditional military power and asymmetric technological superiority, with nuclear deterrence, international alliance constraints, and economic vulnerability constituting the double yoke. Historical cases and realistic data show that no party can achieve a decisive victory, and the war will eventually fall into a stalemate that “can’t afford to fight, can’t stop”. Only through limited compromise under international mediation can we avoid both sides falling victim to geopolitical games. This potential conflict reminds the world that, in the globalized and nuclear age, military victory is no longer the answer to resolving disputes.

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